



## **APPENDIX**

### **Supreme Court of the United States**

October Term, **1970**

No. **14**

**STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,**

**Appellant,**

**vs.**

**HENRY C. ALFORD,**

**Appellee.**

**APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

**FILED FEBRUARY 19, 1969  
PRIMA FACIE JURISDICTION NOTED APRIL 1, 1969**

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# **Supreme Court of the United States**

**October Term, 1968**

**No. 1064**

**STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,**

**Appellant,**

**vs.**

**HENRY C. ALFORD,**

**Appellee.**

## **RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES**

- (1) December 10, 1963. Judgment in the case of **STATE v. HENRY C. ALFORD**, December 2, 1963 Term, Forsyth County Superior Court, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
- (2) March 18, 1964. Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed in the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
- (3) March 24, 1964. Petition for Writ of Certiorari denied with instructions that the case be remanded to the Superior Court of Forsyth County to appoint counsel and conduct a post-conviction hearing.
- (4) December 7, 1964. Post-conviction proceeding held at the December 7, 1964 Criminal Session of the Forsyth County Superior Court before the Honorable Frank M. Armstrong.
- (5) March 19, 1965. Order entered by Honorable Frank M. Armstrong, Judge Presiding at the December 7, 1964 Criminal Session of the Forsyth County Superior Court, denying post-conviction relief.
- (6) March 26, 1965. Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed in the Forsyth County Superior Court.



- (7) April 14, 1965. Petition for Writ of Mandamus denied by the Forsyth County Superior Court.
- (8) June 16, 1965. Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.
- (9) June 18, 1965. Order signed by Eugene A. Gordon, United States District Judge in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent, No. C-112-G-65, dismissing the application for Writ of Habeas Corpus due to lack of jurisdiction.
- (10) July 7, 1965. Order signed by Eugene A. Gordon, United States District Judge, in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent, No. C-112-G-65, reinstating the application for Writ of Habeas Corpus due to newly acquired jurisdiction.
- (11) July 12, 1965. Return to Habeas Corpus and Return to Show Cause filed by the Respondent, State of North Carolina, in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent, No. C-112-G-65.
- (12) July 26, 1965. Proof of Service and Answer of Respondent in opposition to the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Dismiss filed by the Respondent, State of North Carolina, in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent, No. C-112-G-65.
- (13) September 3, 1965. Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by Eugene A. Gordon, United States District Judge, in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent, No. C-112-G-65.
- (14) October 26, 1965. Notice of Appeal filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North

Carolina in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent, No. C-112-G-65.

- (15) November 24, 1965. Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by Eugene A. Gordon, United States District Judge, in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent, No. C-112-G-65.
- (16) December 8, 1965. Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- (17) August 3, 1966. Memorandum Decision signed by Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Appellant, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Appellee, No. 220.
- (18) August 25, 1966. Memorandum Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, signed by a panel of said Court, in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Appellant, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Appellee, No. 10,391.
- (19) June 1, 1967. Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by Eugene A. Gordon, United States District Judge, in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent, No. C-98-G-67.
- (20) April 4, 1968. Certificate of Probable Cause signed by Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Appellant, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Appellee, No. 11,598.
- (21) November 26, 1968. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Appellant, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Appellee, No. 11,598 (405 F.2d 340).

- (22) December 23, 1968. Notice of Appeal filed by the State of North Carolina in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the case of HENRY C. ALFORD, Appellant, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Appellee, No. 11,598.
  - (23) December 23, 1968. Motion of the State of North Carolina for Stay of Mandate pending appeal filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
  - (24) December 27, 1968. Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Staying Mandate..
  - (25) January 8, 1969. Motion for Bail filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
  - (26) January 13, 1969. Answer to Motion for Bail filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
  - (27) January 20, 1969. Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denying appellee's Motion for Bail.
  - (28) February 17, 1969. Statement as to Jurisdiction filed in the Supreme Court of the United States by the State of North Carolina in the case of the STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Appellant, v. HENRY C. ALFORD, Appellee, No. 1064, October Term, 1968.
  - (29) April 7, 1969. Probable Jurisdiction noted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Appellant, v. HENRY C. ALFORD, Appellee, No. 1064, October Term, 1968.
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EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY  
OF HENRY C. ALFORD  
TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY  
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT, FORSYTH COUNTY,  
NORTH CAROLINA  
DECEMBER 2, 1963 TERM

MR. LUPTON: Your Honor, in this case Henry C. Alford is charged with the murder of Nathaniel Young on or about the 22nd day of November, 1963. Henry C. Alford, what is your plea?

MR. CRUMPLER: We tender a plea of guilty to second degree murder.

THE COURT: Let the record show that when the case was called for trial the defendant, through his attorney, tendered to the State a plea of guilty to second degree murder, which plea is accepted by the State.

MR. CRUMPLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

[pp. 1-2]

THE COURT: Well, is there anything else?

MR. CRUMPLER: Your Honor, if you'll give me just a second. Your Honor, the defendant wishes to take the stand.

THE COURT: All right. Let him be sworn.

HENRY C. ALFORD, having been first duly sworn on The Holy Bible, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. CRUMPLER:

Q. Henry, you have asked to take the stand in order that you can make whatever statement you want. Go ahead and tell His Honor what you would like to say.

A. Yes, sir. Well, the night—well, on that night I was walking down to Nathaniel's house and met Georgia and she said

she wanted a little drink of whiskey and couldn't find any, and I said that we'll go to a friend's [p. 13] house on 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ , and when we got there the radio was playing or records, somewhere, and we danced, and nobody was arguing in the house, and so—and I talked to Georgia and—I didn't have but \$1 'cause I bought a half a pint of whiskey, and she wanted me to have more money. I got my check but I didn't have it with me. It was left in my wardrobe when I changed my work clothes. And I went to Claremont—I carried her coat—they got after me for the coat and then—they didn't get the coat. I went up to 7th Street and come back to Greenwood and I come back down Greenwood and I went home and seen the check was in the billfold. I wanted to know—and I came back out and said—Ruby told me to go across the street and so I collected her \$3 and she had tried to collect it and he wouldn't give it to her, and there was no admission about no gun or shooting over there, and his girl friend he lives with came to the door and said, "The law is around over there at your house," and I said, "What are they over there for?" And she said she didn't know, and I said, "Well, let me go out the back door," and I went out the back door and said, "I'm going to cash my check," and I got a cab and went to cash my check, and so when I come back I met Betty. Betty said the law had been to my house and got Ruby and the shotgun, and I said, "What was they [p. 14] doing with the shotgun?" And Betty said she didn't know but that they had got Ruby and the shotgun. And so I gave Betty a dime to call the police headquarters and ask why Ruby was up there and see how much bond was she under. I thought she was going to jail for whiskey, but they didn't have no bond, and they asked her where is Henry C. Alford at, asked Betty on the phone, and we started up the street and—she said she didn't know—and we went up the street, going up Cleveland, and went to my house, and there wasn't no whiskey in the house but the gun was gone like she said, and so we went back across Cleveland and bought



a drink of whiskey to her cousin's house and we came back and I said, "Well, what are they going to do with her?" first, and I says, "You go down the street," and so I was walking down Cleveland and Betty went down towards the officer's car—she lives down that way about three doors from me, from where I live, and so I walked down there and the officer came up by himself and he—and he called me—I walked on the left-hand side of Cleveland and he said, "Hey, fellow, what is your name?" And I told him, and he wanted to know where I was going and I told him to Ruby McGill's, and I was walking on Cleveland and he drove up behind me and stopped me again and said for me to come here a minute in the car, and at that time he was [p. 15] by himself and he walked around to the door and I got in the car and he said, "What is your name?" and I told him, and he said, "Where do you live?" and I told him, 1112 East 10½, and by that time I heard one of the officers talking on the two-way radio about Ruby saying I had on a black cap and black coat on the two-way radio, and some more officers come and right behind them come some more and stopped and—Joe McFadden and another one—there was four officer's cars at one time there—and Joe McFadden come over there and says, "That's Henry Alford," and they arrested me, and I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said there is too much evidence, but I ain't shot no man, but I take the fault for the other man. We never had an argument in our life and I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't they would gas me for it, and that is all.

MR. CRUMPLER: Your Honor, it's going to be necessary—I have, as best I could, set these facts out in this affidavit, but I want to ask him a few questions.

Q. Now, you have consulted with me on several occasions before we came to court?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that is two or three times for the last two or three terms? [p. 16]

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And during that time you had the privilege of being—seeing me and also see your sister and the other friends that have been around—the right to visit you and help prepare your case?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And, also, I have advised you, as your attorney, of the various degrees of murder and the difference between second and first degree and your rights of appeal and the court's power and discretion in each of those cases?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And including the right of a jury to find you not guilty, and to the right to plead before the Governor of the State of North Carolina?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you authorized me to tender a plea of guilty to second degree murder before the court?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And in doing that, that you have again affirmed your decision on that point?

A. Well, I'm still pleading that you all got me to plead guilty. I plead the other way, circumstantial evidence; that the jury will prosecute me on—on the second. You told me to plead guilty, right. I don't—I'm not guilty but I plead guilty. [p. 17]

THE COURT: Well, he said that you plead guilty to second degree murder.

A. Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is that your desire now?

A. Yes sir, I plead guilty on—from the circumstances that he told me.

MR. CRUMPLER: I don't know what to do with the man, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You are court-appointed?

MR. CRUMPLER: Yes, sir. Your Honor, if the Court would allow me I —

THE COURT: I want to ask him some questions myself up here. You were born down in Rocky Mount on May 18, 1918 weren't you?

A. Yes, sir.

THE COURT: June 18, 1918?

A. Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Now, how many times have you served penitentiary sentences in your life?

A. About three times.

THE COURT: How many people have you been charged with murdering in your life?

A. One accident.

THE COURT: Where was that?

A. In Virginia. [p. 18]

THE COURT: Well, you killed that person? You served a sentence for that?

A. Yes, sir.

THE COURT: How long did you serve for killing that man?

A. Six years.

THE COURT: What was your sentence?

A. Ten.

THE COURT: And you got out in six years?

A. Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Well now, how many times have you been convicted of armed robbery?

A. Nine times.

THE COURT: What else have you been convicted of?

A. Whiskey and stuff like that.

THE COURT: What did you serve on those?

A. I pulled time for hauling stolen goods in Robeson County.

THE COURT: How much time did you make in that case?

A. Four years altogether.

THE COURT: What else have you been convicted of?

A. I don't know.

THE COURT: Well, you said you served three sentences.

A. Well, one was for forgery. I wrote some checks.

THE COURT: How much time did you serve for forgery?

[p. 19]

A. Two years.

THE COURT: Well, you didn't come to Winston-Salem till 1960 did you?

A. No, sir.

THE COURT: And since you came to Winston-Salem you have been convicted of carrying a concealed weapon here?

A. Here?

THE COURT: Yes, on August 19, 1960.

A. Nothing but a pocket knife.

**THE COURT:** Just a pocket knife?

A. Yes.

**THE COURT:** Well, you were convicted of assault, charged in two cases of assault with a deadly weapon in 1960 when you came here weren't you?

A. No, sir. I don't know anything about that.

**THE COURT:** Well, you were up before Judge Same on October 2, 1963 for cursing and abusing an officer?

A. Yes sir, I was up for that.

**THE COURT:** And you were found guilty of it?

A. Yes. I pleaded guilty.

**THE COURT:** And you were up for disorderly conduct in October; is that right?

A. Yes.

**THE COURT:** And you were up for assault on some [p. 20] woman in September; is that right?

A. Yes.

**THE COURT:** And you have been convicted of driving an automobile intoxicated and driving after your license were revoked and violation of the prohibition law all since you came here in 1960?

A. Yes.

**THE COURT:** All right. Step down.

**MR. CRUMPLER:** That is all of the evidence that I have on his behalf, Your Honor.

**THE COURT:** Well, let the defendant stand up. It is the judgment of the Court that he be confined in the State's Prison for a term of thirty years. [p. 21]



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA  
GREENSBORO DIVISION

HENRY C. ALFORD,	)	
	)	
Petitioner	)	
	)	
v.	)	NO. C-112-G-65
	)	
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,	)	
Respondent	)	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner, Henry C. Alford, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and accompanied the petition with an affidavit of poverty. The petition was filed *pro se* and an order has heretofore been entered permitting the petition to be filed without the prepayment of costs or fees, or security therefor. Petitioner contends that he was denied due process of law in that his plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder was not voluntary; that he remained in the custody of law enforcement officers for a period of forty-two hours before a warrant was issued for his arrest; that his house was illegally searched and the alleged murder weapon was illegally seized; and that he was not allowed to have witnesses at his trial. The Court denies the relief requested by the petitioner for reasons hereinafter set forth.

Petitioner filed his first application for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court on June 16, 1965. On June 18, 1965, the Court entered an order dismissing the application as petitioner was incarcerated at Raleigh, North Carolina, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. On June 21, 1965, the Court received a paper-writing which informed the

Court that petitioner had been transferred to Blanche, North Carolina, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and that he was then incarcerated there. Thereafter, on July 7, 1965, the Court entered an order stating that it considered the paper-writing a motion to reconsider the petition of the petitioner, which the Court granted and further ordered the petition to be filed.

Petitioner was taken into custody by law enforcement officers in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, on November 22, 1963, and a warrant for petitioner's arrest was issued on November 23, 1963. Subsequently, at the December 2, 1963, Term of Superior Court of Forsyth County, petitioner was indicted for murder, and Fred G. Crumpler was appointed attorney for the petitioner by the Superior Court. On December 10, 1963, petitioner's case was called for trial in the Superior Court of Forsyth County, and upon a plea of guilty to second-degree murder, petitioner was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. No appeal was taken. Subsequently, petitioner applied for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, but the writ was denied on March 24, 1964, and the case remanded to the end that the petitioner be given a post-conviction hearing in the Superior Court of Forsyth County pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 15, Article 22, Section 217. At the December 7, 1964, Term of Superior Court of Forsyth County, petitioner was given a hearing before Judge Frank M. Armstrong. Thereafter, on March 19, 1965, Judge Armstrong entered an order containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law denying petitioner any relief. Petitioner then requested a writ of mandamus from the Superior Court of Forsyth County, and the same was denied on April 14, 1965. Petitioner then applied for another post-conviction hearing, and this was denied on May 3, 1965.

After the post-conviction hearing at the December 7, 1964, Term of Superior Court of Forsyth County and the rendition of the order by Judge Armstrong on March 19, 1965, there is no evidence that the petitioner applied for a writ of certiorari

in order that the Supreme Court of North Carolina might review the hearing and decision. Where the avenue for review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina is still open, a failure to request such review may be fatal to the Court's jurisdiction as the petitioner would have failed to exhaust his state remedies. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254: *Rhinehart v. North Carolina*, 4 Cir., 344 F. 2d 114 (1965). Under Chapter 15, Section 222, of the General Statutes of North Carolina, it is provided that the writ of certiorari must be applied for within sixty days after the entry of judgment. The petitioner has neglected to pursue his remedy in this respect within the time allotted and is now precluded from obtaining such writ. Therefore, it appears that the petitioner has exhausted all state remedies in that certiorari is not now available to him.

The petitioner alleged that he has been denied due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitution in that, first, in his trial in the Superior Court of Forsyth County, his plea of guilty was not voluntary, but was coerced by his court-appointed attorney, Fred G. Crumpler, and the Clerk of the Superior Court; second, that he remained in custody of law enforcement officers for a period of forty-two hours before a warrant for his arrest was issued; third, that his house was illegally searched and the alleged murder weapon was illegally seized; and fourth, that he was not allowed to have witnesses at his trial.

The Court is of the opinion that if the petitioner's plea of guilty is found to be voluntary, then his other three contentions are not sufficient to merit him relief. Entry of a valid plea of guilty and a conviction based on such plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects such as alleged by petitioner in his second, third and fourth contentions. *Hoffman v. United States*, 9 Cir., 327 F. 2d 489 (1964); *Adkins v. United States*, 8 Cir., 298 F. 2d 842 (1962), cert. den. 370 U. S. 954, 82 S. Ct. 1604, 8 L. Ed. 2d 819; *Bloombaum v. United States*, 4 Cir., 211 F. 2d 944 (1954). Being of the opinion that the petitioner's plea was voluntary, the Court will only consider in this Memorandum the first contention of the petitioner.

This Court may deny petitioner a hearing and accept the findings of fact of the state court if petitioner has been given a full and fair hearing in the state court and its findings of fact meet the required standards. *Townsend v. Sain*, 372 U. S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963); *United States v. Wilkins*, 2 Cir., 333 F. 2d 742 (1964), cert. den. 379 U. S. 877, \_\_\_\_ S. Ct. \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_ L. Ed. 2d \_\_\_\_; *United States ex rel. Hall v. People of State of Illinois*, 7 Cir., 329 F. 2d 354 (1964), cert. den. 379 U. S. 891, \_\_\_\_ S. Ct. \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_ L. Ed. 2d \_\_\_\_; *Davis v. Holman*, 237 F. Supp. 490 (M.D. Ala. 1965); *Mills v. Holman*, 225 F. Supp. 886 (M.D. Ala. 1964).

The Supreme Court of the United States in *Townsend v. Sain*, 373 U. S. 293, 312, 313, sets forth the rules and standards for federal courts to follow in accepting the findings of fact of the state court by saying:

“\* \* \* In other words a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts.

“We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.”

With these standards in mind and after giving consideration to the record as a whole, including the transcript of the post-conviction hearing, the Court finds that the merits of the petitioner's contention that his plea of guilty was not voluntary has been properly and judiciously resolved after a full and

fair hearing, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by Judge Armstrong are fully supported by the record as a whole. At the post-conviction hearing, the petitioner was represented by court-appointed counsel, and the following persons testified: Fred G. Crumpler, court appointed attorney for petitioner at his trial and who petitioner alleges coerced him into making a plea of guilty; Mrs. Christine Green, sister of the petitioner; Robert Haskins, Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court of Forsyth County and who petitioner alleges also coerced him into entering a plea of guilty; and the petitioner. The material facts were developed at the hearing, and no allegation of newly discovered evidence was made at the time of the hearing or now. The Court can find no reason that would indicate that the petitioner was not given a full and fair hearing, and concludes that the post-conviction hearing and the findings of fact from that hearing meet all the required tests. Therefore, the Court adopts the Findings of Fact of the state court.

Judge Frank M. Armstrong, who presided over the post-conviction hearing of the petitioner at the December 7, 1964, Term of Superior Court of Forsyth County in his order dated March 19, 1965, found that the petitioner's plea of guilty was voluntary. Judge Armstrong stated:

"That on December 2, 1963, Mr. Fred G. Crumpler was appointed by the Court to serve as counsel for Henry C. Alford who was charged in a bill of indictment with the crime of murder in the first degree. That Henry C. Alford, through his said attorney, entered a plea of guilty to the offense of murder in the second degree on December 10, 1963. That before the plea was entered, Fred G. Crumpler, Jr., who is an able trial lawyer with extensive experience in the trial of criminal cases, made a thorough investigation of the case, including the questioning of the investigating officers, all other witnesses for the State, and other persons who appeared to have some information. That the said attorney contacted all witnesses named to



him by the defendant, except a person designated as 'Jap,' who could not be located; that the said attorney found that none of the witnesses could give testimony helpful to the defendant, but that all of their testimony was detrimental to the defendant. That the said attorney further found that the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming and that the petitioner was confronted with a very serious case of murder. That the said attorney discussed the matter with the petitioner on several occasions, and advised him of the testimony that the witnesses would give against him, and also advised him of the possible verdicts that a jury could render in the case. That the petitioner, after talking to his attorney and his sister, decided that he wanted to enter a plea of guilty to second degree murder and he signed a written statement in which he authorized his attorney to enter a plea of guilty of second degree murder in his behalf, said statement being sworn to before Mr. R. B. Haskins, a Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court. That Mr. Haskins read the statement to the petitioner and asked him if he understood it and the petitioner said he did, and that he stated that he wanted to sign it and that he did sign it under oath in the presence of the said Deputy Clerk. That thereafter on December 10, 1963, the petitioner through his counsel, entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree; that the petitioner's attorney did not persuade him to enter the said plea nor coerce him to do so.

"That the petitioner willingly, knowingly and understandingly entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree on December 10, 1963, in the Superior Court of Forsyth County and was sentenced to serve a term of thirty years in the State's Prison."

The Court is cognizant of the fact that it can only adopt the facts found by the state court, and the Court must supply the applicable law. *Townsend v. Sain, supra*. However, by adopting the state court's findings as to the voluntariness of

the petitioner's plea of guilty, the conclusion follows that the sentence was imposed after a valid guilty plea and the plea was sufficient without more to warrant a conviction. *Armstrong v. United States*, 4 Cir., 256 F. 2d 294 (1958), cert. den. 358 U. S. 856, 79 S. Ct. 88, 3 L. Ed. 2d 90.

The Court finds that petitioner has not been denied his constitutional rights; therefore, the relief sought is denied.

### ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, Henry C. Alford, be, and the same is hereby denied and dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk forward a certified copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Petitioner at the place of his confinement.

EUGENE A. GORDON  
United States District Judge

A True Copy  
Teste  
Herman Amasa Smith, Clerk  
By: Bobbie D. Wyont  
Deputy Clerk  
September 3, 1965

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 220

Henry C. Alford,

Appellant,

versus

State of North Carolina,

Appellee.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle  
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Henry C. Alford, a North Carolina prisoner, has petitioned in forma pauperis for a writ of habeas corpus.

Alford's unsuccessful petition in the District Court has been noted in another case (No. 10,391). I have obtained a supplement to the record in No. 10,391 and after reviewing the files, transcript and other papers I have concluded that Alford is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

Alford's petition is based upon several contentions. We turn first to the claim that his guilty plea was the product of fear and coercion as well as the ineffective assistance of counsel.

The record includes a transcript of a plenary hearing in a state court during Alford's unsuccessful attempt to avail himself of North Carolina's postconviction relief statute. The transcript reveals that Alford was represented by an experienced criminal lawyer who conferred with him on "numerous" occasions before trial. (Tr. 3).

There is a conflict in the testimony over why Alford actually pleaded guilty but the state court found that he did so because his attorney wisely advised him to plead guilty to second degree murder and escape the possibility of capital punishment. The state court also found that the attorney interviewed all the witnesses Alford named with the exception of one, who could not be located. (Supp. to Rec. preceding p. 37). The state judge found that Alford decided to plead guilty because he had no defense to the State's case against him for first degree murder and because the guilty plea allowed him to escape the possibility of the death sentence. There is ample evidence to support this finding of fact and I see no reason to disagree with it.

Having found that Alford's guilty plea was voluntarily made upon the competent advice of counsel, there is no reason to inquire into the claims Alford raises regarding illegal search and seizure, denial of witnesses and illegal detention. See *Hoffman v. United States*, 9 Cir., 327 F. 2d 489.

The District Court reached the same conclusion after a thorough explanation of the facts. (Supp. to Rec. pp. 37-44). I am of the opinion that the District Court's interpretation of the applicable facts and law is correct and therefore it is unnecessary to repeat either in detail.

The petitioner is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis but his petition is denied. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (a) this order shall be entered in the records of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.

*Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.*  
Chief Judge, Fourth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10,391

Henry C. Alford,

Appellant,

versus

State of North Carolina,

Appellee.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle  
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.

---

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Henry C. Alford, a North Carolina prisoner, appeals in  
forma pauperis from an order of the District Court.

Alford was convicted upon a plea of guilty of second degree  
murder and sentenced to thirty years by the Superior Court  
of Forsyth County. He did not appeal, but later instituted  
postconviction proceedings in the state court to collaterally  
attack the validity of his conviction.

On December 7, 1864, Alford was granted a plenary hearing  
by the state court. At the hearing he was represented by  
court-appointed counsel who urged that Alford's guilty plea  
was the product of fear and coercion and the inadequate rep-  
resentation of counsel. The state court denied Alford's petition  
for relief. Thereafter Alford petitioned the United States  
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina  
(Gordon, J.) for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court  
entered a show cause order and the State answered. Included  
in the answer was a transcript of the state-court hearing and  
the opinion of the state judge. On the basis of the record the



District Court determined that Alford had not been denied any right which would justify the issuance of the writ and dismissed the petition.

Forty-eight days after the District Court's order denying the writ was entered Alford filed a notice of appeal. The District Court considered the notice as "a motion in the cause to allow an appeal and a motion for a new hearing." (Rec. 4). Both were denied for the reasons set forth in the District Court's memorandum order. (Rec. 3-8). From that denial Alford appeals in forma pauperis.

The District Court was correct in denying Alford's motions. The record in the case clearly shows that he failed to attempt an appeal until well after the thirty-day time limit had expired. Moreover, there was no reason given why the case should be reopened in the District Court. That Court does not have to entertain successive writs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253.

There is no danger of injustice based upon a procedural technicality in this case. Alford has also submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to a judge of this Court and that petition will be considered on the merits.

Accordingly the appeal is dismissed and a certificate of probable cause is denied.

*Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.*  
Chief Judge, Fourth Circuit

*Harrison L. Winter*  
United States Circuit Judge

*J. Braxton Craven, Jr.*  
United States Circuit Judge

A true copy, Teste:  
*Maurice S. Dean*, Clerk,  
U.S. Court of Appeals  
for the Fourth Circuit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA  
GREENSBORO DIVISION

HENRY C. ALFORD, )  
Petitioner )

v. )

NO. C-98-G-67

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )  
Respondent )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GORDON, District Judge

The petitioner, Henry C. Alford, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, has filed with this Court still another petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254, and accompanies the petition with an affidavit of poverty. The petition was filed *pro se* and an order has been entered permitting the petition filed without the prepayment of cost for fees or security therefor. The petitioner contends his constitutional rights were deprived in that:

1. His home was searched without a search warrant being issued.
2. He was denied his right to counsel at an interrogation.
3. He was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

The voluminous files in this case reflect that this is the third petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Federal Courts to be dealt with on its merits; this in addition to numerous collateral attacks directed through state court channels.

On September 7, 1965, his first petition for a writ of habeas

corpus was denied in a Memorandum Opinion from this Court which dealt sufficiently with petitioner's trial and state post-conviction hearing that they need not be reiterated here.

Since September 7, 1965, petitioner's motion to appeal from the above decision after the lapse of the requisite time limit was denied by Memorandum and Order dated November 24, 1965. This denial was affirmed on appeal.<sup>1</sup> On December 8, 1965, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed directly with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In a Memorandum Decision dated August 3, 1966, the Honorable Clement F. Haynsworth denied the petition. Numerous other petitions and motions have been before this Court, but do not affect the merits of this present petition and require no discussion.

Petitioner raises substantially the same contentions in this petition as have been raised in the two previous federal petitions. Both Memorandum Decisions denying petitioner relief have held that his guilty plea was voluntary. This determination precludes any consideration of the first and second contentions in the present petition because the voluntary guilty plea waives all defenses and non-jurisdictional defects occurring in any prior stage of the proceedings against the person so pleading. *U.S. v. McMann*, 2 Cir., 349 F. 2d 1018 (1965); *Busby v. Holman*, 5 Cir., 356 F. 2d 75 (1966); *Bloombaum v. U.S.*, 4 Cir., 211 F. 2d 944 (1954).

In his third contention, the petitioner raises a question as to the competency of his counsel and the effectiveness of his assistance. Although Judge Haynsworth touched upon this allegation, it will be dealt with on its merits.

It is now well settled that a federal hearing is unnecessary if the petitioner received a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state post conviction proceeding in accordance with the standards set out in *Townsend v. Sain*, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).<sup>2</sup> This

<sup>1</sup>U.S.C.A., 4 Cir., Case #10,391, Memorandum Decision filed August 25, 1966.

<sup>2</sup>*Duckett v. Steiner*, 4 Cir., 332 F. 2d 178 (1964).

court can accept the findings of fact of the state court to which facts this Court must apply federal law.

On the basis of the post-conviction hearing, Judge Frank M. Armstrong entered an order on March 19, 1965, which made certain applicable findings of fact:

"That on December 2, 1963, Mr. Fred G. Crumpler was appointed by the Court to serve as counsel for Henry C. Alford, who was charged in a bill of indictment with the crime of murder in the first degree. That Henry C. Alford, through his said attorney, entered a plea of guilty to the offense of murder in the second degree on December 10, 1963. That before the plea was entered, Fred G. Crumpler, Jr., who is an able trial lawyer, with extensive experience in the trial of criminal cases, made a thorough investigation of the case, including the questioning of the investigating officers, all other witnesses for the State, and other persons who appeared to have some information. That the said attorney contacted all witnesses named to him by the defendant, except a person designated as 'Jap,' who could not be located; that the said attorney found that none of the witnesses could give testimony helpful to the defendant, but that all of their testimony was detrimental to the defendant. That the said attorney further found that the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming and that the petitioner was confronted with a very serious case of murder. That the said attorney discussed the matter with the petitioner on several occasions, and advised him of the testimony that the witnesses would give against him, and also advised him of the possible verdicts that a jury could render in the case. That the petitioner, after talking to his attorney and his sister, decided that he wanted to enter a plea of guilty to second degree murder and he signed a written statement in which he authorized his attorney to enter a plea of guilty of second degree murder in his behalf, said statement being sworn to before Mr. R. B. Haskins, a Deputy Clerk of

the Superior Court. That Mr. Haskins read the statement to the petitioner and asked him if he understood it and the petitioner said he did, and that he stated that he wanted to sign it and that he did sign it under oath in the presence of the said Deputy Clerk. That thereafter on December 10, 1963, the petitioner through his counsel, entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree; that the petitioner's attorney did not persuade him to enter the said plea nor coerce him to do so."

Upon this set of facts it is conclusive that petitioner's counsel was not constitutionally defective under the applicable standards. *Tompa v. Virginia*, 4 Cir., 331 F. 2d 552 (1964).

This Court, having found petitioner has not been denied his constitutional rights, denies the petition and the relief sought therein.

### ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, Henry C. Alford, be, and the same is hereby denied and dismissed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk forward a certified copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the petitioner at his place of confinement and two certified copies to the Attorney General of the State of North Carolina.

*Eugene A. Gordon*  
United States District Judge

June 1, 1967

A True Copy  
Teste:  
Herman Amasa Smith, Clerk  
By:

Judy A. Mabe  
Deputy Clerk



**United States Court of Appeals****FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

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No. 11,598

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Henry C. Alford,

Appellant,

*versus*

State of North Carolina,

Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.  
Eugene A. Gordon, District Judge.

---

(Argued June 18, 1968. Decided November 26, 1968.)

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Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and BRYAN and  
WINTER, Circuit Judges.

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Doris R. Bray (Court-assigned counsel) [Smith, Moore, Smith,  
Schell & Hunter on brief] for Appellant, and Jacob L. Safron,  
Staff Attorney, Office of the Attorney General of North Caro-  
lina (T. W. Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, on  
brief) for Appellee.

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner seeks review of the summary denial of his peti-  
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. Because we conclude that,

under the guiding principles of *United States v. Jackson*, 390 U. S. 570 (1968),<sup>1</sup> enunciated subsequent to the judgment of the district court, petitioner's plea of guilty to the crime of second degree murder was demonstrably coerced, the judgment appealed from will be reversed and the district court directed to issue the writ, staying its effect for a reasonable period to enable North Carolina to retry petitioner if it be so advised.

Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury of the State of North Carolina for murder in the first degree. With the approval of the state, he pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree and was sentenced on December 10, 1963, to a term of thirty years.

In due course, he sought and was granted a post-conviction hearing, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15-217 - 15-222 (1965). The state judge who conducted the hearing rejected petitioner's various constitutional contentions, including the claim that his guilty plea had been involuntarily induced. After the unsuccessful pursuit of various state remedies, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from the district court. On September 3, 1965, the district judge denied the relief sought, expressly adopting the facts concerning the voluntariness of petitioner's plea as previously found by the state judge in the post-conviction proceedings. After the time for appeal to this Court had expired, petitioner filed with the district court a purported notice of appeal, which was treated by the district court as a motion for a certificate of probable cause and a motion for a new hearing. Both motions were denied, and we dismissed pe-

1. See also, *Pope v. United States*, 392 U. S. 651 (1968) (per curiam), which applied the principle of *Jackson* to the death penalty provisions of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. §2113(e) (1964). We note that the Court in *Pope* invalidated the capital punishment provision with no discussion of any peculiarities in the legislative history of the Bank Robbery Act such as those which occupied the Court in *Jackson* in relation to the Federal Kidnaping Act. Indeed, the legislative history of the Bank Robbery Act shows that as originally enacted imprisonment and capital punishment were alternative punishments, and that these alternatives were unaccompanied by a severability clause, 48 Stat. 783. Thus, *Pope* has precedential value in determining how statutes should be brought into conformity with *Jackson*, as a matter of statutory construction.

tioner's appeal on the ground that it had not been perfected within the prescribed thirty-day time limit. *Alford v. North Carolina*, No. 10,391 (4 Cir. August 25, 1966) (Mem.).

Concurrently, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in this Court and was denied by Chief Judge Haynsworth, who also rejected petitioner's various constitutional contentions.<sup>2</sup> Again, in 1967, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from the district court and, again, relief was denied.

In acting upon the 1967 petition, the district judge apparently considered that inquiry into the voluntariness of petitioner's guilty plea was foreclosed by the prior consideration of this question by the district court and by Chief Judge Haynsworth. The district judge, therefore, dealt primarily with, and rejected, petitioner's contention that he had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.<sup>3</sup>

— I —

The State of North Carolina argues that petitioner has not presented either to this Court or to the district court any new factual allegations which should disturb the prior and unanimous findings of fact concerning the voluntariness of the plea of guilt. The rule of the federal courts, expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1967 Supp.),<sup>4</sup> is not to entertain successive and repeti-

2. It should be noted, however, that the record before Chief Judge Haynsworth apparently did not contain a transcript of petitioner's trial. See, *Alford v. North Carolina*, Misc. No. 220 (4 Cir. August 3, 1966) (Mem.) As we shall see, the trial transcript casts significant light upon the question of the voluntariness of petitioner's plea. Additionally, Chief Judge Haynsworth's disposition of the petition preceded the decision in *United States v. Jackson*, 390 U. S. 570 (1968).

3. In view of our disposition of this appeal, we need consider neither this contention nor petitioner's other constitutional challenges urged upon the district court, which were an alleged unlawful search of petitioner's home and an alleged denial of the right to counsel at an interrogation. We deal only with the question of voluntariness of petitioner's guilty plea.

4. 28 U.S.C. (1967 Supp.):  
"§2244. Finality of determination.

• • • • •

(b) When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits or a material factual issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the

tive habeas corpus petitions if the grounds asserted to support the petition have been previously decided on the merits, and the ends of justice would not be advanced by plenary consideration of the subsequent application. See, *Sanders v. United States*, 373 U. S. 1, 11, 15-19 (1963). We do not depart from this doctrine. However, the instant appeal deals primarily not with new factual allegations but, rather, with what is admittedly a new question of law, namely, the applicability and effect of the Supreme Court's recent decision in the *Jackson* case. To the extent that the appeal raises this question of law, what was said in *Sanders* is significant:

"Even if the same ground was rejected on the merits on a prior application, it is open to the applicant to show that the ends of justice would be served by permitting the redetermination of the ground \* \* \* If purely legal questions are involved, the applicant may be entitled to a new hearing upon showing an intervening change in the law or some other justification for having failed to raise a crucial point or argument in the prior application. \* \* \* the foregoing enumeration is not intended to be exhaustive; the test is 'the ends of justice' and it cannot be too finely particularized." 373 U. S., at 16-17. (emphasis added).<sup>5</sup>

To the extent that proper disposition of the instant appeal depends upon factual considerations, this is the first time that the transcript of petitioner's original trial and of his state post-conviction proceedings have both been before the full

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United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such a person need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ." (emphasis added.)

5. While *Sanders* spoke of proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §2255, the present federal substitute for habeas corpus, the considerations it discussed are no less applicable to habeas corpus by a prisoner incarcerated under state process.

court. *Res judicata* has no place in habeas corpus proceedings. *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U. S. 391 (1963); *Sanders v. United States*, *supra*. Especially is this so when there is reason to reappraise the facts because of the introduction of a new pertinent rule of law. Thus, we conclude that we are not precluded from a reconsideration of petitioner's constitutional argument based upon the *Jackson* case, or his factual argument based upon a consideration of the entire record of the proceedings, alone, or in the light of *Jackson*.

## — II —

There can be little question but that petitioner tendered his plea of guilty at a time that he was the subject of impermissible burdens condemned in the *Jackson* case. *Jackson* held invalid the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act,<sup>6</sup> on the basis that it had a chilling effect upon the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and the Fifth Amendment right "not to plead guilty," i.e., the privilege against self-incrimination. Of course, *Jackson* was a case which arose under the Fifth and Six Amendments as such, while the instant case, a state prosecution, concerns the Fourteenth Amendment; but the test of what violates the Fourteenth Amendment in this area is the same.<sup>7</sup>

The federal statute in *Jackson* essentially created the special offense of "kidnaping where the victim has not been liberated

6. 18 U.S.C. (1964 Ed.)

"§1201. Transportation.

(a) Whosoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed." (emphasis added.)

7. The Sixth Amendment right of trial by jury is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. *Parker v. Gladden*, 385 U. S. 363 (1966); *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U. S. 145 (1968). The Fourteenth Amendment outlaws coerced guilty pleas in state prosecutions. See, e.g., *Herman v. Claudy*, 350 U. S. 116 (1956). A coerced guilty plea is, of course, an infringement upon the right not to plead guilty, i.e., the privilege against self-incrimination.



unharméd" punishable by imprisonment for a term of years or for life or by death, upon the discretionary, yet binding, recommendation of the jury. Where a victim has not been liberated unharméd, only an accused *who exercised his right to a jury determination of guilt or innocence* faced the prospect of the possible imposition of the death penalty. This prospect was sufficient, in the view of the Court, to render the death penalty provision unconstitutional on the two separate grounds: (1) the fact that the jury alone could impose the death penalty tended to deter the exercise of the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) the statutory scheme tended to encourage pleas of guilty or, stated otherwise, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty.

North Carolina law presently prescribes the death penalty for murder in the first degree,<sup>8</sup> as well as certain other crimes.<sup>9</sup> In each instance the penalty prescribed is death; in each instance also the jury may, in its discretion, obligatorily recommend that punishment be imprisonment for life. North Carolina does not permit an accused who pleads not guilty to waive a jury trial.<sup>10</sup> The accused may avoid a jury trial only if he pleads guilty and, by statute, a plea of guilty may not result

8. N. C. Gen. Stat. §14-17 (1953):

"Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment. — A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death: *Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than two nor more than thirty years in the State's prison.*" (emphasis added.)

9. N. C. Gen. Stat. §14-21 (1953) (forcible rape of female of age twelve years or more or carnal knowledge of female under twelve); N. C. Gen. Stat. §14-52 (1953) (burglary in the first degree); N. C. Gen. Stat. §14-58 (1953) (arson).

10. "No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful persons in open court\*\*\*." N. C. Const., Art. I, §13. This right cannot be waived. *State v. Muse*, 219 N. C. 226, 13 S. E. 2d 229 (1941); *State v. Hull*, 209 N. C. 53, 182 S. E. 718 (1935).

in a punishment more severe than life imprisonment.<sup>11</sup> Thus, a person accused of a capital crime in North Carolina is faced with the awesome dilemma of risking the death penalty in order to assert his rights to a jury trial and not to plead guilty, or, alternatively, of pleading guilty to avoid the possibility of capital punishment. It was precisely this sort of inhibitory or chilling effect upon the exercise of constitutional rights which the Supreme Court condemned in *Jackson*, because a statutory scheme such as that employed by North Carolina "needlessly encourages" guilty pleas and jury waivers.<sup>12</sup>

North Carolina seeks to distinguish the instant case from *Jackson* on the ground that under the Federal Kidnaping Act the jury possessed the authority to *increase* the punishment to be imposed upon the defendant beyond that which the court could impose; while under North Carolina law the statutorily-prescribed penalty for murder in the first degree and certain other crimes is death and the jury is merely given the power to *mitigate* the harshness of the maximum penalty. We are not persuaded that the difference amounts to a distinction. Under both statutes it is the jury which determines guilt, and that jury alone which, in its discretion, decides if the death penalty is to be exacted. As to imposition or non-imposition of the death penalty the jury's determination is exclusive, conclusive and final. Of greater significance, in *Jackson* the argument was

11. An accused who pleads guilty to one of the four capital crimes is to be sentenced to life imprisonment. N. C. Gen. Stat. §15-162.1(a),(b), (1965). In the instant case, petitioner was allowed to plead guilty to murder in the second degree with the concurrence of the state and the trial court. The maximum penalty for this offense, to which appellant was sentenced, is thirty years. N. C. Gen. Stat. §14-17 (1953).

12. Indeed, it is arguable that the North Carolina statutory scheme is more objectionable than the former Federal Kidnaping Act. Under the federal statute, the accused had three choices: he could plead guilty, not guilty and accept a jury trial, or not guilty and, with the consent of the prosecutor and the court, waive a jury trial. Thus, an accused could simultaneously avoid the death penalty and assert his innocence in a guilt-determining proceeding, namely, a bench trial. The accused in North Carolina has no such option; if he asserts his innocence at all, he risks capital punishment. Therefore, unlike the federal scheme, every defendant in a North Carolina capital case is, in the phraseology of *Jackson*, "needlessly encourage [d]" to forego his rights to a jury trial and not to plead guilty.

advanced that the Federal Kidnaping Act's penalty provisions operated to "mitigate the severity of punishment" and that it was, therefore, immaterial that the Act "may have the incidental effect of inducing defendants not to contest in full measure" their culpability. The Court explicitly rejected this contention, stating that the consequent chilling effect upon the exercise of constitutional rights was "unnecessary and therefore excessive." 390 U. S. 570, at 582. *Jackson* thus renders unavailing North Carolina's argument.

Nor do we find persuasive North Carolina's further argument that in *Jackson* the Court did not question the constitutionality of the death penalty *per se*. Undoubtedly this is true, but the Court in *Jackson* was careful to state that whatever the power to impose a death penalty "Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right." 390 U. S. 570, at 583. The clear import of *Jackson* is that if North Carolina wishes to retain the death penalty it must do so by means different from those presently enacted. That there are other means is self-evident. See, e.g., *United States v. Jackson*, 390 U. S., at 582-83.

We are thus constrained to disagree with the dictum of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in *State v. Peele*, 274 N. C. 106, 161 S.E. 2d 568 (1968), that there are "certain material differences" between the Federal Kidnaping Act and the North Carolina statutes,<sup>13</sup> so that "*Jackson* is not authority for holding the death penalty in North Carolina may not be imposed under any circumstances." (161 S.E. 2d, at 572). To the contrary, we conclude that in the present posture of the North Carolina statutes the various provisions for the imposition of the death penalty are unconstitutional, and hence capital punishment may not, under *Jackson*, be imposed under any circumstances.<sup>14</sup>

13. But see, *Laboy v. State of New Jersey*, 266 F.S. 581 (D.N.J. 1967), which reached an opposite conclusion with respect to the New Jersey statutes which in turn are like the North Carolina statutes.

14. As Chief Judge Haynsworth notes in dissent, South Carolina has sought to avoid the *Jackson* problem by holding in *State v. Harper*, \_\_\_\_\_ S.C. \_\_\_\_\_,

Since the argument in this case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has decided *State v. Forcella*, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968). Because of the similarity between the North Carolina and New Jersey statutes, the case is of significance to us. Under New Jersey law an individual accused of murder has essentially two choices: (1) he may assert his innocence by demanding a trial by jury, in which case, if convicted, he may be sentenced to death, or (2) he may enter a plea non vult, or nolo contendere, which, if accepted, carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. In *Forcella* this statutory scheme was assailed under *Jackson*.

By a split decision the New Jersey Court held the *Jackson* rationale not controlling. This result was influenced by several considerations, but the real basis of decision was, we believe, an erroneous reading of *Jackson*. The majority pointed out that under New Jersey law only a jury could determine guilt or innocence if that issue were contested. Coupled with this fact, the majority read *Jackson* to render the Sixth Amendment right applicable only when there are two alternative guilt-determining processes and the jury trial alternative produces greater risks for the accused, and further, to hold that both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights must be violated before the statutory scheme would become vulnerable to constitutional attack.

We do not find this reading persuasive. Under a strict *Jackson*-type statute, such as the Federal Kidnaping Act, an accused who pleads not guilty and seeks a bench trial waives

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162 S.E. 2d 712 (1968), that the South Carolina statute, which makes a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree, when accepted, the equivalent of a verdict of guilty with a recommendation of mercy (§17-553.4, 1967 Supp. to 1962 Code of Laws), is invalid and by requiring the submission of the issue of punishment to the jury in every case. We express no view whether the laws of South Carolina, as so construed, comport with *Jackson*. We note in passing that the purported solution to the *Jackson* problem arrived at by the South Carolina court runs directly counter to the current national trend which has produced a marked curtailment in the employment of the death penalty device. However, it is enough for the purpose of this case that North Carolina has not amended its statutes, nor has its Supreme Court undertaken to limit them in the light of *Jackson*.

only his right to a jury trial. An accused who pleads guilty (or non vult) in either the *Jackson* or *Forcella* situations simultaneously foregoes both his right to a jury trial and his right not to plead guilty.

*Jackson* arose in the context of a challenge to the indictment before the defendant entered any plea. Since *Jackson* had thus given no indication that he might ultimately wish to waive his right to a jury trial or his right to assert his innocence, the Court had before it the effect of the federal act on both of *Jackson's* rights. We think it incorrect to say that they were "intertwined" so that the majority in *Jackson* did not "say that a statute which did no more than limit the penalty upon acceptance of a guilty plea must violate the Fifth Amendment." *State v. Forcella*, 245 A.2d 185-186.

Like the dissenters in *Forcella*, we read *Jackson* to treat the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to be independent constitutional underpinnings for the result. It follows therefore, that the New Jersey statutory scheme, like that of North Carolina, is more conspicuously invalid than the federal statute in *Jackson*, because under the federal statute an accused could assert his innocence and avoid a death sentence by a bench trial, while in New Jersey avoidance of a death sentence may be accomplished only by waiver of the right to plead not guilty and by waiver of the right to a jury trial. *Jackson* condemned the needless encouragement of guilty pleas and waiver of jury trials. Greater encouragement is inevitable in a New Jersey-type statute than in the federal statutes held invalid, in part, in *Jackson* and *Pope*. Thus, we decline to follow *Forcella*.

*Jackson* arose by a motion to quash an indictment grounded on the Federal Kidnaping Act. The case at bar arises, *inter alia*, from an attack upon the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. While *Jackson* clearly stands for the proposition that the death penalty provisions of North Carolina constitute an invalid burden upon the right to a jury trial and the right not to plead guilty, it falls short of holding that the North Carolina stat-



utory provisions for the imposition of capital punishment are in themselves inherently coercive.<sup>15</sup> In *Jackson* the Court stated that the mere fact that an accused had pleaded guilty to a charge under the Federal Kidnaping Act did not necessarily render his plea involuntary and require reversal of his conviction.<sup>16</sup>

By a parity of reasoning, we think that a defendant who has pleaded guilty when charged with a capital offense in North Carolina is not necessarily entitled to post-conviction relief as a matter of law. *Jackson* by defining what are the impermissible burdens of a statutory scheme like that of North Carolina must be read, however, to hold that a prisoner is entitled to relief if he can demonstrate that his plea was a product of those burdens—specifically, that his principal motivation to plead guilty or to forego a trial by jury was to avoid the death penalty. *Jackson* thus defined a new factor to be given weight in determining the voluntariness of a plea—a factor present in full measure in the instant case because of the North Carolina statutory scheme.<sup>17</sup> As we read *Jackson*, we must determine the extent to which, if at all, petitioner was moved to plead

15. ".... the evil in the ... statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right." 390 U. S., at 583. (emphasis in original.) See also, *Gilmore v. California*, 364 F. 2d 916, 918 (9 Cir. 1966); *LaBoy v. New Jersey*, 286 F. S. 581, 85 (D. N.J. 1967)

16. See, 390 U. S., at 583 & n. 25. The Court also referred to its opinion in *Griffin v. California*, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), which held that a defendant's failure to testify could not be commented upon by the prosecution or the trial court. The Court noted that it "obviously does not follow that every defendant who ever testified at a pre-*Griffin* trial in a State where the prosecution could have commented upon his failure to do so is entitled to automatic release upon the theory that his testimony must be regarded as compelled." *Id.*, at 583, n. 25.

17. It is immaterial in our view that petitioner pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree rather than to murder in the first degree under which he was charged. For all that appears in the record, the state had not surrendered its right to prosecute petitioner for first degree murder until the time when he agreed to plead guilty to second degree murder. Of course, if the state had determined that it would only prosecute for second degree murder, and this fact had been known to the petitioner before his plea was entered, then it could hardly be maintained that his guilty plea was a product of a fear of the death penalty.

guilty because of the incentive which the North Carolina statutory scheme supplied to achieve that result.<sup>18</sup>

— III —

In the light of the principles we distill from *Jackson*, we have no hesitancy in concluding from our examination of the record that petitioner's plea of guilty was made involuntarily, and that petitioner is entitled to relief by habeas corpus.<sup>19</sup>

The record is uncontradicted that from the time that petitioner entered his plea he professed his innocence of any homicide. No court has ever found that he pleaded guilty other than to avoid possible imposition of the death penalty.<sup>20</sup> During the course of his first appearance before the court, petitioner stated:

To us the *Jackson* defect in the North Carolina statutes potentially infects the validity of the acceptance of a plea of guilty to any lesser included offense. This is not to say, however, that where, as here, the plea is accepted to a lesser included offense, there is not a higher burden of proof upon one attacking the judgment entered thereon to show that the plea was the result of an invidious consideration than if the plea were to the degree of the crime which would support capital punishment. The very process of downgrading the charge may well suggest that the plea was motivated by factors other than a fear of death; certainly, it is circumstantial evidence that punishment by death was not a substantial possibility in view of the prosecutor's acquiescence in significant concessions. From a strictly evidentiary standpoint, we think this case is not the ordinary one and petitioner has met the burden of proof placed on him.

18. To the extent that *Gilmore v. California*, 364 F. 2d 916 (9 Cir. 1966), cited to us by North Carolina, may be read as holding that a statutorily supplied incentive to plead guilty so as to avoid the death penalty may not as a matter of law render the plea involuntary, we think that its holding has been undermined by *Jackson*.

19. The dissent argues that we perform a futile act in granting post-conviction relief because, if it assumed that North Carolina corrects the *Jackson* defect in its statutory scheme, petitioner "if he is well advised" will merely plead guilty once again to second degree murder. Of course, North Carolina may, at some future time, enact a capital punishment statute which is not constitutionally infirm under *Jackson*. However, we do not agree with the implied premise of the dissenting opinion that petitioner originally pleaded guilty because of the evidence informally arrayed against him, rather than because of the threat of an unconstitutionally imposed death penalty. As the text will show, petitioner, immediately after hearing the prosecutor's claim of what it would prove, responded, "I ain't shot no man."

20. In denying petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus to this Court, Chief Judge Haynsworth so characterized the state post-conviction judge's findings:

"\* \* \* I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said there is too much evidence, but I ain't shot no man, but I take the fault for the other man. We never had an argument in our life and *I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't they would gas me for it*, and that is all." (emphasis added.)

Later, when questioned by his attorney concerning whether he still desired to plead guilty, petitioner reiterated his innocence, and gave voice to his fear of what the jury might do:

"Well, I'm still pleading that you all got me to plead guilty. I plead the other way, circumstantial evidence; that the jury will prosecute me on—on the second. You told me to plead guilty, right. I don't—I'm not guilty but I plead guilty."

The trial judge inquired whether petitioner still wished to plead guilty, and the question evoked the following response:

"Yes, sir, I plead guilty on—from the circumstances that he told me."

The plain meaning of petitioner's statements at the time that he entered his plea was fully corroborated by the testimony of his trial counsel when the latter was called as a witness at the state post-conviction hearing. The attorney, Mr. Crumpler, described what had transpired as follows:

"The understanding that I had when the trial proceeded—the Judge—Judge Johnston either asked him or I asked Judge Johnston to ask him to make sure that his plea was clear to him, and it's my memory—to the best of

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"\* \* \* there is a conflict in the testimony over why Alford actually pleaded guilty but the state court found that he did so because his attorney wisely advised him to plead guilty to second degree murder and escape the possibility of capital punishment. \* \* \* The state judge found that Alford decided to plead guilty because he had no defense to the State's case against him for first degree murder and because the guilty plea allowed him to escape the possibility of the death sentence. There is ample evidence to support this finding of fact." *Alford v. North Carolina*, No. 220 (4 Cir. August 3, 1968) (Mem.). (emphasis added.)

my memory he stated that he didn't do what he was charged of but he was going to plead guilty, or plead guilty to second degree *because he didn't want to run the risk of losing his life*. I don't pretend that that is verbatim, but that is to the best of my recollection." (emphasis added.)

The petitioner also testified in the state post-conviction proceedings, and his testimony then was perfectly consistent with what he had said at the time that he entered his plea:

"Mr. Crumpler said if *I didn't enter a plea I would surely get a death sentence*. That is what he told me. And my sister and a policeman, Joe McFadden, my first cousin, he was there, too. And I can't read or write, and he just run over it because he knew I couldn't understand it and *he said if I didn't take a plea of second degree I would surely get a death sentence*. And my sister said I'd better take it,<sup>21</sup> and he told Judge Johnston that I told him to give me thirty years, said I don't know how to try this case. Then, nobody didn't say that I done that crime, nobody in court said I did the crime." (emphasis added.)

We think that there is no question but that the incentive supplied to petitioner to plead guilty by the North Carolina

21. Alford's sister, Mrs. Christine Greene, related her version of this encounter in an affidavit filed in the Superior Court of Forsyth County, North Carolina, dated June 19, 1965. It reads in pertinent part as follows:

"Mr. Crumpler then advised Henry that the Solicitor had intimated that he would recommend that the Court accept a plea of guilty to second degree murder and Mr. Crumpler explained that the maximum punishment for second degree murder was thirty years and that in his, Mr. Crumpler's opinion, the Court would probably sentence Henry for thirty years due to the nature of the case. Henry at first stated that he wanted to plead guilty to second degree murder; then a few minutes later, he changed his mind. I explained to Henry that if he got thirty years, I could still visit him and *it would be better than running a risk of losing his life*. Henry, at this time, was undecided and Mr. Crumpler left the cell and left us with Henry. A few minutes later, he returned and advised Henry that whatever decision he made would have to be his own decision and that no one could make the decision for him. Mr. Crumpler also advised that he could make either decision, but that we would have to reach some decision because the case was about to be called for trial. *Henry then said that he didn't kill the deceased person, but that he did not want to be killed either, and at this time stated that he wanted to enter a plea of guilty to second degree murder.*" (emphasis added.)

statutory scheme was the primary motivating force to effect tender of the plea, especially since throughout the proceedings petitioner has protested his innocence.<sup>22</sup> Further evidentiary hearings are unnecessary. Under *Jackson*, therefore, the judgment entered on the plea cannot stand.

*REVERSED and REMANDED*

HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, dissenting:

I disagree, for I think a critical difference lies in the fact that Alford did not enter a plea of guilty to the charge of murder in the first degree. His plea of guilty was to the lesser offense of murder in the second degree, the maximum statutory punishment for which is imprisonment for not more than thirty years. In the historical context of North Carolina's statutes, this is a distinction of importance.

In *United States v. Jackson*, 390 U. S. 570, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statutory scheme under which capital punishment could be imposed only by a jury after a trial upon a plea of not guilty. The risk of death, which would be encountered only if the defendant pled not guilty and demanded a jury trial was held to be an impermissible burden upon the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the capital punishment amendment of the "Lindbergh Act" was thus unconstitutional, but the remainder of the statute, as enacted earlier, was left intact. Dismissal of the indictment, therefore, was vacated and the case remanded, so that the prisoner would be required to exercise his choices as to his plea and to a jury trial in a context in which the risk of death would not burden one set of choices.

22. Whether petitioner is in reality guilty or innocent has not been judicially determined. In any event, petitioner has never conceded his guilt. That fact alone should have precluded plea bargaining under the rule announced in *Bailey v. MacDougall*, 392 F. 2d 155, 158 n. 7 (4 Cir. 1968), "Plea-bargaining that induces an innocent person to plead guilty cannot be sanctioned. Negotiations must be limited to the quantum of punishment for an *admittedly* guilty defendant." (emphasis supplied.) This case is thus an inappropriate vehicle in which to discuss plea bargaining.



Here the defendant clearly stated when he tendered his plea that he was substantially motivated by the fear of execution if he entered a plea of not guilty. His contemporaneous claim of innocence may be suspect,<sup>1</sup> but the circumstances fully support his conscious purpose to avoid the risk of capital punishment. Under the circumstances, had the plea been to first degree murder, I would agree with the majority that the conviction should be set aside, for the victim of the very pressures *Jackson* sought to avoid ought not to be left to suffer their consequences.

The plea of guilty to murder in the second degree, however, was not the product of the constitutional infirmity in the Statute. Had the infirmity not been present, the risk of capital punishment on a conviction of murder in the first degree would have constituted precisely the same pressure for a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense. Had North Carolina's statute provided that upon a conviction of murder in the first degree, whether after a trial on a plea of not guilty or after acceptance of a plea of guilty, the judge in his discretion could impose the death sentence, or imprisonment for life or for a term of years, there would have been no constitutional defect in the statute. Yet, in those circumstances, the pressure upon Alford to enter a plea to murder in the second degree would not have differed in the slightest from the pressure he actually experienced.

Alford will be subject to retrial, of course. North Carolina may remove the infirmity from its statute, so that when Alford is rearraigned, he will be in the same position he was in initially.<sup>2</sup> If he is well advised, he will again tender a plea

1. Before the guilty plea was accepted, there was an informal statement of the State's evidence, including declarations by the defendant a few moments before the homicide of his purpose to kill the victim and admissions, shortly thereafter, that he had done it. If the State's case at a trial was as strong as the statement indicated, the defendant would have little hope of acquittal.

2. I do not here consider the impact which *Green v. United States*, 355 U. S. 184, and *Patton v. North Carolina*, 4 Cir., 381 F. 2d 636, might have upon retrial. See n.4 *infra*.



of murder in the second degree. He will have gained nothing, and needless time and money will have been expended because of an infirmity in the statute which bears no causal relationship to the entry of the plea which the majority strikes.

Whenever a defendant bargains for a plea to a lesser, included offense, he is substantially motivated by fear of exposure to the greater punishment authorized upon conviction of the crime as charged. If the maximum punishment for the greater offense is death, there are emotional overtones which are not present if the maximum punishment is imprisonment for life or for a term of years; but the presence of a risk of capital punishment creates no conceptual distinction in a determination of the validity of bargaining for a plea to a lesser, included offense. The death penalty is no longer imposed with frequency, and a defendant may have a greater fear of the risk of a more likely sentence of life imprisonment than of the risk of less likely capital punishment. A difference in the prospect of imprisonment of one year rather than ten, of five years rather than twenty, of twenty years rather than life can weigh momentarily with a defendant.

Such plea-bargaining, when the defendant is properly represented is both useful and desirable in the administration of justice. It greatly conserves judicial time and energy, leaving the courts available for the trial of cases in which there is no basis for accommodation between the parties. It is a very humane avenue of protection for a person charged with crime who recognizes his exposure to the risk of heavy punishment.

There is nothing in *Jackson* which intimates disapproval of that kind of plea-bargaining. Its absence, or the absence of agreement, is the thing that produced the *Jackson* dilemma. Yet, that is all that happened here. Alford successfully bargained for a plea to a lesser, included offense, which made him immune to life imprisonment as well as to capital punishment. He would have done the same thing had the capital punishment provision of the statute not been constitutionally defec-

tive. He may be expected to do the same thing again at his retrial. In *Jackson* the statutory defect created the issue, here it has no causal connection with it.

There is the fact that everyone involved in the negotiation of Alford's plea reasonably believed that North Carolina's statute validly authorized a jury to impose capital punishment upon a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, while limiting the court to the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment upon a plea of guilty to that offense. Their misconception, revealed by *Jackson*, is relevant here, only if the effect of *Jackson* is an invalidation of the death penalty in North Carolina. We have no present basis for a conclusion that it is, as a comparative analysis of the Federal Kidnapping Act and North Carolina's murder statutes will demonstrate.

The Supreme Court in *Jackson* carefully considered the history of the Lindbergh Kidnapping Act. As originally enacted it permitted no more than life imprisonment. Later, however, it was amended to permit a jury, in its discretion, to impose capital punishment if the victim was not released unharmed. It was the amendment which created the difficulty and the pressure to forego a defendant's Fifth and Six Amendment rights. It was the amendment which the Court struck, for it reasonably concluded that Congress would prefer that the statute be left in its original form than for the nation to be left with no federal kidnapping statute.

The history of North Carolina's murder statutes contrasts starkly with that of the Lindbergh Act. Until 1949 the only penalty for first degree murder in North Carolina was death. Neither judge nor jury had any discretion about it, though juries have ways of avoiding the harsh strictures of such laws, and many a defendant whom the jury believed guilty of first degree murder must have been found guilty of a lesser, included offense. In 1949, however, N. C. Gen. Stat, § 14-17 was amended to permit the jury in its discretion to attach to its verdict of guilty a recommendation of mercy. Such a recom-

mendation required the court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. Four years later, in 1953, § 15-162.1 (b) was enacted making a plea of guilty, when accepted by the court, the equivalent of a verdict of guilty with a recommendation of mercy and prescribing the imposition of a life sentence.

The amendments to the North Carolina statutes, like the amendment of the Lindbergh Act, introduced the *Jackson* infirmity. Though the North Carolina amendments were ameliorating, because they introduced the infirmity into the statutory scheme, they may be rationally said to be unconstitutional, just as the amendment in *Jackson*, leaving intact North Carolina's preamendment statute.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently dealt with the *Jackson* problem in *State v. Harper*, \_\_\_\_\_ S. C. \_\_\_\_\_, 162 S.E. 2d 712, (1968).

It concluded that *Jackson* invalidated South Carolina's statute, similar to North Carolina's § 15-162.1 (b), making a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree, when accepted, the equivalent of a verdict of guilty with a recommendation of mercy. It prescribed the submission of the question of punishment to a jury in every capital case, regardless of the plea.

There is no reason to suppose that North Carolina's Supreme Court will not come to a similar resolution of the *Jackson* problem. It has indicated no antipathy toward capital punishment.<sup>3</sup> The death penalty has been an integral part of the laws of North Carolina relating to murder since it first became a state, and it is not suggested that it is unconstitutional *per se*. Since it was the 1949 and 1953 Acts which introduced the *Jackson* infirmity, it may be expected that the courts of North Carolina will invalidate them, or portions of them, rather than all or parts of her earlier integrated statute.

3. The contrary is indicated by its holding that a prosecutor, by asking for life imprisonment only, may not limit the jury's discretion to impose capital punishment. *State v. Denny*, 249 N. C. 113; 105 S. E. 2d 446 (1958). The jury had directed life imprisonment, but on the prisoner's appeal the Court ordered a new trial at which the jury's discretion to impose capital punishment would not be limited, as it had been by prosecutor and judge.

Whatever the courts of North Carolina or her legislature may do to meet the problem, we now have no right to lay the infirmity to North Carolina's hoary authorization of the death penalty rather than to the later statutes which injected into the scheme the *Jackson* deprivations of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. There is presently no basis for our assuming the demise of capital punishment in North Carolina.<sup>4</sup>

The fact of the misconception of North Carolina's lawyers and judges that her statutes validly authorized the imposition of the death penalty only by a jury would be relevant, therefore, only if the plea was to the capital offense. In such a case, had the defendant known at the time that his plea would not limit his exposure to capital punishment, he might well have chosen to plead not guilty. That misconception is wholly irrelevant, however, when the plea is to a noncapital offense. Knowledge at the time that the court might impose capital punishment upon a plea of guilty to the capital crime could have had no possible effect upon his choice to plead guilty to the lesser, noncapital offense.

I think, therefore, that *Jackson* requires the retrial in North Carolina only of those defendants, who, for the purpose of avoiding risk of capital punishment, entered guilty pleas to the capital offense.<sup>5</sup>

4. This conclusion is unaffected by *Pope v. United States*, 392 U.S. 651. In *Pope* the Supreme Court, on the authority of *Jackson*, and the Solicitor General's concession vacated a death sentence imposed under the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 2113(e). It permits the imposition of the death penalty if the defendant in the course of the offense or subsequent flight or escape kills or kidnaps someone, but the death sentence may be imposed only if a jury directs it. The *Jackson* defect was introduced into the statute as originally enacted. There was no prior history of the statute free of the *Jackson* infirmity. In the context of our problem, therefore, *Pope* is neutral. It does not militate against invalidation of an ameliorating amendment which introduced the *Jackson* defect rather than invalidation of portions of an earlier statutory scheme which contained no *Jackson* defect. If, therefore, *Jackson* requires invalidation of North Carolina's present statutory scheme of imposing punishment for murder in the first degree, we have no present warrant for assuming that it invalidates anything other than the amendment which introduced the defect into the scheme, just as *Jackson* held.

5. *Quare* whether *Patton v. North Carolina*, 4 Cir., 381 F.2d 636, applies in this kind of a situation to foreclose pitting the defendant, who seeks a retrial, to the choice he contends he should have had in the first instance.

The constitutional provisions and statutes of the State of North Carolina declared unconstitutional by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which are involved are:

North Carolina Constitution, Article I. Sec. 13:

"No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of good and lawful persons in open court . . ."

North Carolina General Statute 15-162.1. Plea of guilty of first degree murder, first degree burglary, arson or rape:

(b) In the event such plea is accepted, the tender and acceptance thereof shall have the effect of a jury verdict of a crime charged with recommendation by the jury in open court that the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison; and thereupon, the court shall pronounce judgment that the defendant be imprisoned for life in the State's prison.

North Carolina General Statute 14-17. Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment:

A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death: Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than two (2) nor more than thirty (30) years in the State's prison.

North Carolina General Statute 14-21. Punishment for rape:



Every person who is convicted of ravishing and carnally knowing any female of the age of twelve years or more by force and against her will, or who is convicted of unlawfully and carnally knowing and abusing any female child under the age of twelve years, shall suffer death: Provided, if the jury shall so recommend at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury.

North Carolina General Statute 14-52. Punishment for burglary:

Any person convicted, according to due course of law, of the crime of burglary in the first degree shall suffer death: Provided, if the jury when rendering its verdict in open court shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury.

North Carolina General Statute 14-58. Punishment for arson:

Any person convicted according to due course of law of the crime of arson shall suffer death: Provided, if the jury shall so recommend, at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury.



